This Article provides the first comprehensive legal analysis of parents'
INTRODUCTION
The headline might have come from The Onion: "Local Man Fails to Buy Birthday Cake for Three-Year-Old Son." But the national headlines describing Heath Campbell's 2008 visit to a New Jersey supermarket bakery were no joke. Campbell's cake request had one small detail rendering it instantly newsworthy. His child was named "Adolf Hitler Campbell," and although the bakery was willing to inscribe many thoughts in frosting, wishing a happy birthday to Adolf Hitler was not one of them. 1 The Campbell family's fascination with white supremacy was vividly expressed in the names of Adolf's two siblings, "Honszlynn Hinler Jeannie Campbell," an homage to Heinrich Himmler, and 162 
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This Article attempts to illuminate this dark area of the law. I am interested in one overriding question: to what extent can the law constitutionally regulate the names that parents give to their children? The law is filled with the sad detritus of cases in which a child's parents disagree over what the child should be named.
12 These relentlessly depressing cases, usually arising between divorced or unmarried parents, do not particularly interest me. Rather, this Article focuses on situations in which parents agree on their child's proposed name, but the government nonetheless denies that name legal recognition.
Part I examines the current restrictions that states impose on parental choice of names. These restrictions vary widely by state, but some common themes recur. The most typical restrictions are prohibitions on obscenities, numerals, pictograms, diacritical marks, and overly lengthy names. Some states also restrict parental choice of surnames. Other states, by contrast, appear to have no explicit restrictions at all. This Part also offers an international comparison, noting that many countries restrict parental naming rights more extensively than do American jurisdictions.
Part II evaluates current state law under the relevant principles of the U.S. Constitution. Two strands of constitutional doctrine are directly applicable. First, the right to name one's child is likely a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a right is implicit in cases recognizing parental rights over their children, including, most recently, Troxel v. Granville. 13 a parental right to name children is likely to be recognized. Such a right is deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition and has been repeatedly recognized in practice and in law. State restrictions on parental naming rights date from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, well after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the right to name a child is a form of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment, and therefore state laws that restrict names on the basis of their content are subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. This Part then applies the strict scrutiny test to the various state laws that restrict parental naming rights. I conclude that laws against obscenities, ideograms, and pictograms are constitutional, as are certain length restrictions and requirements that the child receive at least two names. Current laws prohibiting certain surnames and laws prohibiting diacritical marks are unconstitutional because they are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Part III turns to the entirely different question of whether state laws might be appropriately augmented in certain circumstances. One hundred years ago, an author in The Yale Law Journal noted that the law governing personal names resembled a "boarding house mattress, with lumps in one place, depressions in another. And while one admirable object of reform is to plane away the hillocks of excessive regulation, it is not improper to direct attention to holes that might be filled." 15 While Part II is devoted to the planing of regulatory hillocks, Part III turns to these holes, in particular the problem of children given names like "Adolf Hitler" that are not prohibited under current law. I conclude that there are significant constitutional hurdles to additional legislation, but that certain narrowly drawn statutes might be permissible. This Part also considers the "Boy Named Sue" problem, and concludes that laws requiring gender matching of names are unconstitutional.
I. THE LAW OF BABY NAMES
The law governing the naming of babies is surprisingly difficult to ascertain. In some states, there is a complete absence of any law on the subject. A Connecticut judge recently discovered, to his astonishment, that Connecticut did not require a name to be placed on a
164
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[Vol. 80:159 child's birth certificate, nor was there any authority whatsoever governing the acquisition of a legal name at birth. 16 The judge noted that "the court has inquired of dozens of Connecticut lawyers and judges, and no one has supplied even a portion of an answer to the question: How is a person's legal name established?" 17 A wide range of issues were thus unaddressed, including "the use of a number in a name, such as CP30 [sic] ; the selection of a name not matching the sex of a child;" or "the repetition of the same word three times as first, middle, and last name, such as Smith Smith Smith."
18
In other states, there are patchwork statutes that address some, but not all, of the potential legal issues. There is also a largely unwritten body of administrative practice, as well as informal practices that Professor Elizabeth Emens, in the context of marital name changes, has referred to as "desk-clerk law." 19 This can be described as "what the person at the desk tells you the law is," and although such assertions are often incorrect, they routinely remain unchallenged.
20
In this Part, I highlight some of the key features of state law in this area, based on state statutes and regulations, as well as direct inquiries to state officials, many of whom were quite helpful in explaining their state's rules and procedures. A brief comparison with the quite different rules of some foreign jurisdictions follows.
A. State Laws
Restrictions on Surnames
In some states, parents may only choose surnames that are directly connected to their own. Louisiana's law is the most restrictive, requiring that a child of a married couple bear the surname of the husband. 21 However, if both the husband and the wife agree, the surname "may be the maiden name of the mother or a combination of the surname of the husband and the maiden name of the mother." Any other surname, such as the surname of the mother's mother, is prohibited.
Tennessee's law is similar, providing that married parents can select either the "surname of the natural father" or "the surname of the natural father in combination with either the mother's surname or the mother's maiden surname." 23 In other words, the father's surname must be included in the baby's surname. His name can be excluded only if both parents mutually agree. 24 If the parents cannot agree on a surname, then "the father's surname shall be entered on the birth certificate as the surname of the child," 25 even if this is not a surname that either parent desired. Tennessee thus effectively guarantees to every married father a statutory right to pass on his surname to his child. There is no corresponding concern for the mother's surname, a troublesome omission under the Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence.
26
The District of Columbia mandates that the "surname of the child shall be the surname of a parent whose name appears on the child's birth certificate, or both surnames recorded in any order or in hyphenated or unhyphenated form, or any surname to which either parent has a familial connection." 27 To invoke the familial-connection provision, parents must provide an "affidavit stating that the chosen surname was or is the surname of a past or current relative or has some other clearly stated familial connection."
28 Submission of a false affidavit can be punished by a fine of up to $200 and imprisonment for up to 90 days.
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32
Indiana requires the child of an unmarried couple to bear the surname of the mother unless there is a properly executed paternity affidavit. 33 Under North Dakota law, the surname of nonmarital children must be shown "on the birth record as the current legal surname of the mother at the time of birth unless an affidavit or an acknowledgment of paternity signed by both parents is received stating the surname to be that of the father." 34 Mississippi provides that in cases of court-determined paternity, "the surname of the child shall be that of the father, unless the judgment specifies otherwise."
35 Rhode Island law similarly requires that if the mother is not married either at the time of birth or of conception, "the child shall bear the mother's surname" unless both the mother and father provide written consent. 36 If a court determines paternity, on the other hand, "the name of the father as determined by the court shall be entered on the birth certificate." 37 South Dakota's law is even more bizarre, stating that if the mother was unmarried at conception, birth, or any time in between, "the mother's surname shall be shown on the birth certificate as the legal surname of the child" unless both parents sign an affidavit of paternity. 38 Under this law, a woman who becomes a widow (or whose partner dies) during her pregnancy must give the child her own surname because the father would be unavailable to sign an affidavit of paternity. Similarly, this law could even apply to the child of a wo- 
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NAMING BABY 167 man who divorced during pregnancy or to a married couple, if the woman had been in the final stages of a divorce to another man at the time of conception and before the remarriage. Surname restrictions such as these were once even more common. Indeed, surname restrictions have triggered the only significant judicial decisions addressing parental naming rights. These decisions are discussed in Part II. For present purposes, however, it is worth noting that the highest court to consider a surname restriction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, upheld the law under the rational basis test.
39 Accordingly, no controlling legal authority requires states to modify these laws.
Requirement of at Least Two Names
Although many state laws are silent on this point, I suspect most states would require parents to select a first name and a surname, rather than just one name. Hawaii, for example, requires married parents to select "both a family name and a given name chosen by one of the child's parents." 40 Curiously, very few states explicitly impose a duty on parents to name their child anything at all. Connecticut is not alone in not requiring a child's name to be entered on the birth certificate. For example, Michigan statutory law does not explicitly require that a child's given name be included on the birth certificate, 41 and indeed a Michigan official has stated that "a child does not have to be given a name at all." 42 Under Nevada law, a birth certificate need not include the child's name, but parents are given a form to submit "as soon as the child shall have been named." 43 Other states do seem to recognize a naming requirement, if only obliquely. An Ohio statute states that "the child shall be registered in the surname designated by the mother," 44 arguably imposing a duty on the mother to provide a surname. Under Florida law, married par-
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Prohibition of Ideograms and Pictograms
A number of states, either through statute or administrative practice, prohibit the use of ideograms or pictograms as part of a child's name. 47 This would preclude, for example, parents from naming their child using the symbol denoting The Artist Formerly Known as Prince. 
Prohibition of Numerals
As far as I can determine, no state prohibits the use of a numeral if it is spelled out. It would be permissible, for example, to name a child "Eight." But several states prohibit the use of a numerical symbol, which would prohibit naming a child "8." New Jersey, for example, permits the State Registrar to reject names that contain "numerals" or a "combination of letters, numerals, or symbols." 49 In Illinois, administrative practice prohibits numerals when used as the first character in a child's name. 50 Texas prohibits numerals as part of the name or suffix, although Roman numerals may be used for suffixes. 51 
Length Restrictions
Some states explicitly limit the length of names, whereas others undoubtedly do so informally. Iowa administrative practice, for example, prohibits names over a certain number of characters due to technological limitations associated with its electronic data systems.
52
In Massachusetts, the first, last, and middle names are limited to forty characters because of software limitations. 
Prohibition of Diacritical Marks
Prohibitions of accent marks and other diacritical marks are common. For example, the California Office of Vital Records provides a handbook to county vital records departments that states birth names can be recorded using only "the 26 alphabetical characters of the English language with appropriate punctuation if necessary."
54
The handbook further specifies that "no pictographs, ideograms, diacritical marks" (including "é," "ñ," and "ç") are allowed. 55 Hence the prohibition on "Lucía" discussed in the Introduction. 56 Kansas imposes similar restrictions. 57 In Massachusetts, the "characters have to be on the standard american [sic] keyboard. So dashes and apostrophes are fine, but not accent marks and the such."
58 New Hampshire prohibits all special characters other than an apostrophe or dash.
59 Accordingly, "O'Connor" is a permissible name in New Hampshire, but "Chacón" is not.
Prohibition of Obscenities
At least two states explicitly prohibit obscenities, and I suspect many other states would prohibit obscene names as well. New Jersey statutory law permits the State Registrar to reject any chosen names or surnames that contain an obscenity. 60 Under Nebraska statutory law, the selection of a surname is the "parents' prerogative, except 52 
No Restrictions at All?
Some states ostensibly impose no restrictions at all upon parents' choice of names. For example, under Kentucky statutory law, the child's surname is "any name chosen by the parents." 63 A Kentucky official has stated that the mother can give her child "any name she wishes."
64 In response to e-mail inquiries, state officials in Delaware, Maryland, and Montana all asserted that their states imposed no restrictions on parents' choice of names.
65 A Washington statute states that an unmarried mother may "give any surname she so desires to her child." 66 There is no similar statutory language with respect to married parents or with respect to first names. 67 South Carolina formerly required that every child be given the surname of the father; 68 now, however, a state official asserts that the state "does allow a mother to name her child without any restrictions."
69
Yet one wonders if these statements are literally true. It seems unlikely that state officials would passively accept an expletive, a 700-letter name, or a name written entirely in Greek characters. Put to the acid test, these general statements about parents' unfettered ability to select a name may well prove unreliable. 
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B. Foreign Practices
Many foreign jurisdictions are significantly more restrictive with respect to naming practices. 70 Portugal, for example, requires governmental approval of names; a list of previously approved and rejected names is available on the Internet. 71 It makes for fascinating reading, displaying a relentless enforcement of "authentic" Portuguese names.
72
Not surprisingly, "Svetlana," "Johann," "Ethel," and "Andy" all fail to make the cut, but so do "Carmencita," "Catelina," and "Iglesias."
73 Portugal also prohibits names that "raise doubts about the sex of the registrant." 74 In 2007, Venezuelan lawmakers proposed legislation that would limit parents to 100 approved names, perhaps because at least 60 Venezuelans bore the first name "Hitler." 75 Spain specifically prohibits "extravagant" or "improper" names. 76 French law permits officials to reject first names that are considered contrary to the welfare of the child. 77 One such name was "Fleur de Marie," rejected by French courts as too eccentric. 78 Argentina prohibits names that are "extravagant, ridiculous, contrary to [ The limited and dated caselaw and academic commentary is not especially helpful on either of these questions. For example, a federal district court in Hawaii has asserted that parents possess a common law right to name their children whatever they want. 81 Few rights are absolute, however, and it is hard to see why this one should be any different. Would the court really recognize a parental right to name a child with an especially vile epithet? An influential 1979 law review article concluded that when parents agree, they "should have the freedom to give their children any reasonable surname." 82 Courts could disallow "a surname chosen for a child by his parents if it were so outrageous or obscene that it was clearly not in the child's best interests to bear the surname."
83 But terms like "reasonable" and "outrageous" are highly subjective and give little guidance to courts on what factors to take into account.
The most relevant bodies of constitutional doctrine are substantive due process jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment and free speech jurisprudence under the First Amendment. This Part develops the arguments for a parental naming right under both bodies of law, and concludes that strict scrutiny is the relevant standard for analyzing restrictions on that right. It further concludes that current laws prohibiting certain surnames and laws prohibiting diacritical marks are unconstitutional, as they are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Laws against obscenities, ideograms and pictograms, and certain length restrictions pass strict scrutiny, as do requirements that the child receive at least two names. None of these decisions, however, explicitly rested on a heightened standard of scrutiny. In the Hawaii case, the court found that the state had failed to assert even a reasonable relation to a legitimate state purpose. 87 In the Florida case, the court held that state intrusions on parental naming rights must have a "reasonable relationship to some state purpose." 88 Because the state had failed to show such a relationship, the court did not address "whether something more than a reasonable relationship must be shown." 89 Similarly, in the North Carolina federal case, the district court held that the statute was "patently defective" under even "the most relaxed of standards." 90 The most thorough airing of the substantive due process issue came in the Eighth Circuit's decision in Henne v. Wright. 91 At issue was a Nebraska statute that prohibited parents from selecting a surname other than their own. At trial, the district court had agreed with the other district courts that had weighed in on this issue, holding that "a parent's right to name his or her child is protected under an extension of the right to privacy that is founded upon the Fourteenth By a two-to-one vote, the Eighth Circuit reversed. The majority opinion by Judge Myron Bright described the alleged right narrowly: "[W]hether a parent has a fundamental right to give a child a surname at birth with which the child has no legally established parental connection." 94 The court held that earlier decisions, such as Meyer v. Nebraska 95 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 96 which had recognized parental rights with respect to training and education, were not controlling. 97 The choice of a surname, the court stated, "possesses little, if any, inherent resemblance to the parental rights of training and education recognized by Meyer and Pierce."
A. Substantive Due Process
98 Claiming that "[t]he custom in this country has always been that a child born in lawful wedlock receives the surname of the father at birth," the court concluded that the asserted right was not grounded in the history and tradition of this Nation, and accordingly could not be recognized as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. 99 The statute could be sustained under rational basis review because it furthered at least three legitimate interests, including the prevention of a false implication of paternity.
100
Judge Richard Sheppard Arnold dissented. He concluded that parents hold a fundamental right to name their own children.
101 Such a right was, "if anything, more personal and intimate, less likely to affect people outside the family, than the right to send the child to a private school or to have the child learn German."
102 He continued, "There is something sacred about a name. It is our own business, not the government's." 103 
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for Nebraska's restrictive naming statute, because at common law people were free to choose their own surnames. 104 There was "no solid tradition of legislation denying any such right," and because people may choose their own names, "[i]t is only a small step to extend the same right to their children's names."
105
Henne remains the only decision of a federal appellate court on the issue of parental naming rights. Despite the support of several of Judge Arnold's Eighth Circuit colleagues, an effort to take the case to the Eighth Circuit en banc failed.
106 Although Judge Arnold's argument is highly persuasive, the issue must nonetheless be reconsidered in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions.
The lower court substantive due process decisions all predate the Supreme Court's two most significant recent substantive due process rulings. In 2000, the Court in Troxel v. Granville invalidated a Washington statute permitting courts to award broad visitation rights over a custodial parent's objection. 107 Although no opinion commanded a majority of the Court, broad language in two of the opinions supports parental naming rights. More generally, in 1997, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court held that to be recognized as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, a right must be both carefully described and objectively deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 108 For judges disinclined to find Troxel dispositive, Glucksberg would provide the relevant framework for evaluating parental naming rights.
Troxel v. Granville
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Troxel (speaking for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer) concluded that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their children. Justice O'Connor stated, "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." 110 Justice Souter, in concurrence, described the right slightly differently, as a "parent's interest[] in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children," but the idea is basically the same.
111
Taken together, Justice O'Connor's opinion and Justice Souter's opinion support a due process right of parents to name their own children. Surely, the right to name a child is an implicit component of "care, custody, and control" of children.
112
Although Justice O'Connor's opinion did not specifically state a standard of scrutiny, her recognition of a fundamental right indicates that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard. 113 Lower courts seeking to faithfully apply existing Supreme Court precedent should conclude that Troxel compels recognition of a parental naming right that is subject to strict scrutiny.
As a predictive matter about future Supreme Court behavior, however, there are risks in overreading Troxel. Three of the five justices who recognized this broad right are no longer serving on the Court, and several of the justices who remain expressed skepticism about the breadth of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Justice Thomas, for example, voted to invalidate the Washington law only with the caveat that "neither party has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights."
114 Justice Scalia was even more hostile, worrying about "a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law."
115 He observed that "[o]nly three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children-two of them from an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated." 116 In his view, "the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to stare decisis 110 Id. at 65. 111 Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 112 Id. at 66 (plurality opinion). 113 Id. at 65-66; see also id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that none of the opinions recognizing a fundamental right "articulate[] the appropriate standard of review" and stating that "I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights"). 114 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 115 Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 116 Id. at 92.
protection."
117 Similarly, Justices Stevens and Kennedy declined to invalidate the Washington statute and expressed concern that the plurality opinion was insufficiently attentive to the state's interests. 118 It is thus far from certain that Troxel would be decided similarly by today's Supreme Court. If a parental naming rights case were to reach the Court, at least some Justices might conclude that Troxel is not dispositive. For these Justices, the Court's broader caselaw in the area of substantive due process would likely be more informative.
Washington v. Glucksberg
Washington v. Glucksberg remains the Court's most comprehensive attempt at articulating a consistent substantive due process methodology. Under the Glucksberg analysis, to be recognized as fundamental a right must be both carefully described and objectively deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. 119 The right of parents to name their children meets both of these tests, and should thus satisfy even those Justices who are most skeptical of substantive due process in general.
a. Carefully Described
The best and most careful description of the right at issue is the right of parents to name their children. The contrary view, seemingly adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Henne, would describe the right almost precisely in terms of whatever law is being challenged. 120 Yet even under the Supreme Court's admonishment that rights be carefully described, this approach is unduly narrow. Consider, for example, a state law that said state officials, not parents, will name every newborn child. Surely the right asserted in this case would be the right of parents to name their children themselves. Similarly, imagine a state law that prohibited parents from naming their child "Barack." It would be nonsensical to contend that the alleged right is the right to 178
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b. Objectively Rooted in Our Nation's History and Tradition, and Implicit in Ordered Liberty
The right of parents to name their children is objectively rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. Indeed, I am aware of no circumstances in American history, other than slavery, 123 in which this right has been exercised by anyone other than parents. Parents, not the government or anybody else, name children.
Indeed, governmental restrictions of any sort on parental naming rights were nonexistent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In England, all birth records were maintained by churches until 1837. 124 This, too, was the practice in early America. 125 Only with the introduction of birth certificates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did American state governments become involved in the naming business. The earliest state law I have located requiring registration of births is an 1844 Massachusetts law that required city and town clerks to transmit birth records to the state. 126 The law provided that the "record of births shall state . . . the name of the child, ( 134 His pages are filled with examples of children given truly awful names. English Puritans used names to convey stern moral lessons, employing names such as "Fear-Not," "PraiseGod," and my personal favorite, "Fly-fornication."
135 American Puritans enthusiastically embraced Biblical names, not only the well-worn "David" and "Rachel," but the far more obscure figures of "Epaphroditus," "Zipporah," and "Mahershalalhashbaz." Equally redolent of a Civil War history exam is the mid-nineteenth century family who named their sons "Kansas Nebraska," "Lecompton Constitution," and "Emancipation Proclamation," while giving their daughters the apparently more feminine names of "Loui- Explicit decisions of American courts have also long recognized that parents have a right to name their children and that this right can be alienated. For example, in 1902 the Iowa Supreme Court held, "That the privilege of naming a child is a valid and legal consideration for a promise is well established by all the authorities." 147 The court explained, "Defendant received the benefit of the name, and the parents parted with the right to give the child such name as they might choose. This, as has been seen, is a valuable consideration." 148 The Indiana Supreme Court held in 1882, "The right to give his child a name was one which the father possessed, and one which he could not be deprived of against his consent." 149 The court noted, "The father is the natural guardian of his child, and entitled to its services during infancy, and within this natural right must fall the privilege of bestowing a name upon it."
150 More recently, a Massachusetts appellate court stated, "The naming of a child is a right and privilege belonging to the child's parents."
151
The right would also appear to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Although this strand of the Glucksberg analysis has not been well developed by courts, it is hard to imagine a functional, democratic society in which parents lack such a basic right as the right to name their own children. Indeed, as far as I am aware, even in the 142 Id. 143 Id. at 622. 144 Id. 145 Id. at 627. 146 Id. 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that under Glucksberg, parents possess a fundamental constitutional right, rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to name their children. Because this right is fundamental, restrictions on the right are subject to strict scrutiny-that is, restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
B. First Amendment
If the issue is approached from the perspective of freedom of speech, the standard is likely to be strict scrutiny as well. In Henne v. Wright, Judge Arnold discussed the First Amendment, noting, "What I call myself or my child is an aspect of speech. When the State says I cannot call my child what I want to call her, my freedom of expression, both oral and written, is lessened."
152 However, Judge Arnold concluded that freedom of speech had not been raised by the parties, and thus was not squarely at issue in the case.
153
Judge Arnold's insight has much to commend it. To return to an earlier example, suppose a state legislature prohibited parents from naming their children "Barack." In this case, the freedom-of-expression aspect is brightly highlighted. Parents who wished to name their child after our President would be prohibited from doing so. 154 Indeed, the very purpose of such a prohibition would be to limit that form of political expression. Naming a child, even if not for a political figure, is a deeply expressive act.
The expressive aspect can be seen even in the naming of animals. I doubt that a strong substantive due process argument could be made for the rights of animal owners to name their animals. But the First Amendment could do the job nicely. Suppose a state passed a law prohibiting dog owners from naming their dog "Palin." This law would directly inhibit a form of political expression, by singling out the name of one particularly controversial figure for prohibition.
If we assume that laws restricting the naming of children restrict free expression, then the general standard of review from First Amendment law is strict scrutiny. Content-based restrictions on pa-152 Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., dissenting). 153 Id. 
182
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 80:159 rental naming choices must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
155
C. State Interests (in General)
All of the constitutional standards require identification of the state interests that justify the law. The state interests are stronger with respect to the names given to children than they are with respect to voluntary name changes by adults. 156 Similarly, the state interests are stronger with respect to children than to animals. A child will bear the consequences of an ill-chosen name in ways that a horse or a dog never will.
157
At least two primary state interests are present with respect to almost any naming restriction. First, there is the state's interest in protecting the child. Children have no control over their names, and children's only protection from abusive names lies with the state. The state has a strong interest in ensuring that children are not saddled with names that are highly destructive to their development as functional adults.
158 Second, the state has an interest in ensuring the communicative function of names.
159
That is, our names are used frequently by other people, perhaps even more often than we use them ourselves. Both the state and other private parties will use the 155 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). Arguably, several state restrictions might be viewed as content-neutral restrictions subject to a lower level of scrutiny. The strongest candidates for this treatment are the requirement of at least two names and the prohibitions on overly lengthy names. The line between content-based and content-neutral laws is far from sharp, but even these restrictions are likely content-based. Imagine a state law that prohibited novelists from naming their characters with only one name or with overly long names. Surely, this would be viewed as a content-based restriction on speech. If this is true for naming fictional characters, it is even more so for naming actual human beings. In any event, even if these laws were viewed as content-neutral under the First Amendment, they would still be subject to strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 156 For an analysis of the constitutional issues raised by adult name change petitions, see 
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D. Application to Particular Cases
Restrictions on Surnames
Although surname restrictions have been invalidated in some states by judicial or legislative action, other states continue to enforce them. 160 Justifications based on administrative convenience and bookkeeping requirements will be unavailing under strict scrutiny. The only state interest that could plausibly be described as compelling is the prevention of false implications of paternity. In the Henne case, Judge Arnold put it this way: "I would have an interest in keeping a stranger from naming her child 'Richard S. Arnold, Jr.,' and the state would have an interest in defending my reputation against such a false implication." 161 Arnold's example demonstrates that certain names can function as defamatory falsehoods. "Richard S. Arnold" is not a common name, and the attachment of "Jr." to the name states that the child is the son of a Richard S. Arnold. The name thus makes a factual statement about paternity, which, if false, imposes significant reputational harm on the alleged father.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that intentionally false statements of fact are generally not entitled to constitutional protection. As Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana 162 put it, "[c]alculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" 163 None of the concerns about robust debate on public issues that were present in libel cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan 164 are present in this context. A court is likely to find that preventing the false implication of paternity is a compelling state interest (or perhaps, in the First Amendment context, that such assertions lie outside of the First Amendment entirely).
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[Vol. 80:159 None of the existing state laws on surname selection, however, are narrowly tailored to serve this interest. Instead of prohibiting only those last names that falsely impute paternity, the statutes prohibit any surname other than those of the parents. This is grossly disproportionate to the state interest, and accordingly fails strict scrutiny. 165 The state interests can be served in other ways. For example, a state might leave this issue to private civil litigation. An Ohio federal district court suggested that "any wrongful presumption or inference that may arise due to a similarity in surnames between a man and a child can be corrected through a civil paternity action."
166 A judicial declaration of nonpaternity, however, does not completely eliminate the ongoing harm created by an individual's use of the suffix "Jr.," possibly for decades after his birth. A defamation action for money damages would be far more useful-a possibility noted by the district court in Henne, which suggested "a court action for damages could afford relief" to persons falsely accused of paternity.
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A defamation action raises several interesting issues. First, does the naming of a child with a false implication of paternity constitute slander or libel? Traditionally, libel is "defamation by written or printed words," whereas slander "consists of communication of a defamatory statement by spoken words, or by transitory gestures." 168 The distinction is relevant in some jurisdictions with respect to whether the plaintiff must plead and prove "special damages" (actual pecuniary harm). 169 Although I have located no authority that speaks to this question, a defamatory name seems closer to libel than to slander. The name is typically recorded on a written birth certificate, and is repeatedly used in written form throughout that person's life. It is relatively permanent and fixed and thus is more analogous to a written publication than to words spoken only once.
Second, would money damages really solve the problem? If Google is correct, I am the only "Carlton F.W. Larson" in the world. If someone named her child "Carlton F.W. Larson, Jr.," there would be an unmistakable reference to my alleged paternity, a reference that 165 Cf. Sec'y of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 366 N.E.2d 717, 726 (Mass. 1977) ("We reserve for another day the question whether, in the absence of a written request of both father and mother, the mother of an illegitimate child may give him substantially the same name as his putative father's, for example his father's entire name followed by 'Junior.' "). 166 
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NAMING BABY 185 would continue for the rest of the child's life, and perhaps beyond. My primary goal in litigation would be to have the name changed. Money damages would not be an entirely satisfactory alternative. Ideally, I would want an injunction requiring the mother to change the child's name to something else. A traditional maxim of equity, however, holds that "equity will not enjoin a libel." 170 In part, this maxim rests on an aversion to prior restraints on publication, 171 a concern that is far less salient in the context of naming a child. Courts are more willing than previously to consider injunctive relief in defamation cases, 172 but there is no guarantee that equitable relief would be available.
The possible unavailability of injunctive relief would provide further support for more narrowly tailored statutory remedies. Specifically, a state could require that any use of the suffix, "Jr.," be supported by proof of paternity. Although this would not completely solve the problem of defamatory implication from mere identity of last names, it would prevent the most egregious defamations at the outset.
Requirement of at Least Two Names
What about parents who refused to give their child any name at all? Such a refusal would amount to an especially brutal form of psychological child abuse. The 1959 United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child states that every child "shall be entitled from his birth to a name." 173 The 1978 American Convention on Human Rights states, "Every person has the right to a given name and to the surnames of his parents or that of one of them." 174 Surely, the state's interest in ensuring that every child has a name is compelling enough to outweigh any parental refusal.
Parents could potentially argue that forcing them to name a child constitutes impermissible compelled speech. Although the Supreme Court's compelled speech caselaw is not especially precise about the standard of scrutiny to be applied in compelled speech cases, 175 a re- 170 Id. A trickier problem is presented by parents who might wish to give their child only one name. Adults with only one name are not unheard of. A New Jersey court held that a woman could change her name to "Koriander," noting that there was no strict rule against single-word names. 177 The court responded to the state's claims of administrative convenience by tartly noting, "Computers and record keepers, however, need not control individual liberties." 178 A clinical professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School as a young adult successfully petitioned a court to be renamed "Mitch." 179 The pattern is not uniform, however, and some states do not permit single names.
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The case for permitting adults to choose single names is far stronger than the case for permitting parents to select such names for their children. As noted above, the American Convention on Human Rights states that every child is entitled to both a first name and a surname. Single names are highly unusual, and a child saddled with this oddity is likely to encounter numerous problems. On balance, the state interest in ensuring that children have at least two names is likely to be compelling enough to overcome strict scrutiny. On the other hand, no such interest would be present with respect to middle names; parents who decline to give their child a middle name should be free to do so.
Prohibition of Ideograms and Pictograms
The case against the use of ideograms and pictograms is relatively straightforward. Such names are almost impossible for anyone else to reproduce, and, lacking any determinate pronunciation, are arguably not even names at all. The spelled-out form solves this problem. But this argument probably proves far too much. Many names are difficult to pronounce, as any experienced teacher can tell you. Difficulty of pronunciation alone cannot be a sufficient reason to prohibit a name. The second interest, which is almost certainly driving the laws at issue, is protecting the child from the possibly dehumanizing aspect of a name that essentially looks like a bar code. For whatever reason, people fear being "reduced to a number." A name with numerals is arguably not really a name at all. Under strict scrutiny, this is a very close case. On balance, a prohibition on numerals might survive strict scrutiny, as long as parents have the option of spelling out the name, although there are certainly decent arguments on the other side.
Length Restrictions
The state concern with lengthy names is that they are unwieldy both for the child and for others who must use them. A 300-letter name, for example, is unusable in almost every conceivable situation and a burden both on the child and on society at large. The problem, of course, is one of line drawing: how long is too long? This is not an easy question to answer, but several baselines are appropriate.
First, there is little reason for the state to limit the number of middle names a person may have. Like many persons of Swedish descent, I have two middle names. Such names are also common in England: for example, the famous writer J.R.R. Tolkien, and Prince Charles, whose full name is Charles Philip Arthur George, both have two middle names. There is no evidence that multiple middle names are harmful to children, and it takes only minimal effort for the state to include additional middle names on a birth certificate. Likewise, there is minimal impact on communication with others, most of which is restricted to first and last names.
Second, any length restrictions on each particular name should be permissive enough to accommodate typical names from a wide variety of cultures, including relatively lengthy Indian and Thai names. Moreover, no restrictions should be justified on the basis of software limitations. If parents could select longer names on typewritten birth certificates, it is preposterous to suggest that this right should disappear merely because the state selected inadequate computer software. Administrative convenience is simply insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny. 187 Within this framework, length restrictions of fifty characters 2011]
NAMING BABY 189
per name may well satisfy strict scrutiny, and limits of fewer characters might do so as well.
Prohibition of Diacritical Marks
Because diacritical marks are common in many countries, and are relatively common in the United States, it is difficult to argue that a name with diacritical marks poses a significant, inherent risk of harm to a child. Restrictions on diacritical marks, if justified at all, would likely rest on their communicative function. In this Subsection, I consider and reject a number of arguments that could be made to support these prohibitions.
First, a state could argue that prohibitions of diacritical marks serve to promote English as the official language. Under this reasoning, only names that can be expressed using the English (Roman) alphabet should be permitted. There are a number of problems with this argument. If this interest is compelling, it is startling how little else states actually do to promote it. No state, so far as I am aware, prevents the informal use of diacritical marks. In California, for example, Latinos routinely use diacritical marks even if such marks are excluded from their birth certificates. Moreover, states do not explicitly prohibit the use of such marks by individuals moving into the state from other countries. Nor do states prohibit non-English names that lack diacritical marks. It is hard to see why permitting the name "Changsurirothenothenom" while prohibiting "Lucía" serves any state interest in promoting the English language. Similarly, states permit Irish names such as "O'Connor" that use an apostrophe not found in strictly English names. The unwillingness of states to enforce "Englishness" in any of these other situations strongly suggests that the asserted state interest is not truly compelling, at least in this context. 188 Second, a more plausible and more frequent argument is that diacritical marks create administrative problems such as confusion in state computer systems, difficulties in recording, and problems in alphabetizing. This argument, although surely sufficient under a rational basis test, is quite unpersuasive under strict scrutiny.
Consider, for example, the case of California, which insists that children's names cannot contain diacritical marks. The state, however, uses diacritical marks in a wide variety of other circumstances. For example, California has two state parks whose official names in-Third, a state might argue that diacritical marks make the name difficult for other people to use, thus significantly hindering the communicative function of the name. This argument has several serious flaws. To begin with, nothing requires private individuals to use the precise form of somebody else's name. If Costco decides to record a customer's name as "Mendez" rather than "Méndez," it is perfectly free to do so, although it may annoy that customer. 198 Unless the state intends to prohibit the informal use of these marks, a prohibition on the birth certificate does not advance this claimed state interest at all. Next, if a governmental entity does not want to record names with diacritical marks for certain purposes, it can probably choose not to do so. U.S. passports, for example, do not include diacritical marks, even for those persons for whom the mark is part of their legal name. 199 Nor do passports recognize the variant capitalization of names like "McDonald," instead printing everything in block capital letters. 200 Similarly, some states do not print hyphens or apostrophes on the names in driver's licenses. 201 Lastly, computer software makes the use of diacritical marks relatively easy in any event; handwritten documents are even easier. The alleged difficulties with communication are truly chimerical.
Fourth, a state can make a slippery slope argument. If names can include Spanish characters like "ñ," why not Greek characters, like "ϕ," or Cyrillic characters, like " ," or Arabic characters, like " "? At some point, this would become ridiculous. A legal name composed of those characters would be indecipherable to the vast majority of Americans and would render the name completely unusable for communicative purposes. Because the line has to be drawn somewhere, this argument goes, the line should be drawn at the twenty-six standard characters of the English alphabet.
This argument has some force, but it is ultimately unpersuasive. The difference between Roman letters that have diacritical marks attached to them and characters that are not based on Roman letters at all is significant. In a pinch, the Roman letter with the diacritical mark Ford ed., 1906) . 198 As someone with two middle names, I am regularly irritated by American businesses that insist on addressing me with only one middle initial.
199 E-mail from Agent #1962, Nat'l Passport Info. Ctr., to Narresh Ravishanker, Research Assistant to Professor Carlton Larson (Feb. 11, 2010, 4:17 PM) (on file with the author). 200 Id. 201 See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 39.02.75.100.01 (2011) (declining to print hyphenated first or middle names on driver's licenses); MD. CODE REGS. 11.17.09.09(B) (2011) (same).
